When considering federal legislation to encourage states to raise the drinking age to twenty-one, public officials faced a common problem: assessing the efficacy of a proposed policy change from evidence that is deficient in quality and quantity. This paper shows how the political system yielded an assessment that was substantially more optimistic than merited by the evidence available at the time. This outcome was strongly shaped by the failure of academia and of the federal agency that oversees traffic safety to provide the intellectual background needed to assess the evidence effectively.
In general the influence of the public, whether directly or through political institutions, has been pernicious to traffic safety. It comes and goes, filling in the troughs between peaks of more exciting events; it seizes on issues without concern for the relevance or tractability of the problems; it proposes "solutions" which are at best naïve and at worst absurd, and above all it demands action even where action may be only a waste of money.
-Frank Haight (1985) Although it is hard to challenge Haight's characterization of…the political process in the area of traffic safety, his proposed solution of entrusting the issue to lowprofile agencies…seems wishful and unrealistic. His viewpoint neglects the fact that the recognition of any condition as a social problem is a political matter. It is not helpful for underdogs in the political game to pick up their chips, denounce the rules…and look elsewhere, when the political game is the only game in town. Even the experts are forced to play it, often as mere adjutants to parties with less sophistication but greater involvement and determination.
-H. Laurence Ross (1992, p. 174) A primary motivation for undertaking economic analysis is to inform public policy.
Economists' penchant for highlighting the policy implications of their results is so widespread it has caused one respected economist to warn against its overuse.
1 Our federalist system, in which the states, "laboratories of democracy," experiment with alternative solutions to social problems, is predicated to some extent on accurate assessments of these experiments, to ensure the most promising solutions thrive. Economists and other policy analysts fill this role.
Yet it is a fruitless quest to peruse the pages of academia for insight into just how the results of formal policy analyses are integrated into policymaking. 2 The subject appears to fall worthy of examination, which could increase our understanding of the evaluative process, improve the quality of its outcomes, and help dispel a certain fatalism that hovers over the existing literature, which treats this problem as intractable rather than a consequence of intellectual, institutional, and political arrangements that can be ameliorated.
The form of this examination is shaped by three key impediments to its execution. First, many relevant "variables," such as political forces or institutional characteristics, cannot be quantified, prohibiting a purely statistical approach. Second, wide variation across policies in the technical issues, political constituencies, and institutions involved heightens the relevance of context and prevents a broad, deductive approach centered around a priori theorizing.
Third, the unusual combination of statistical, political, organizational, and policy-specific technical knowledge that must be invoked precludes an analytical approach that fits cleanly into a well-defined academic field. These impediments necessitate a multifaceted, narrative approach that induces general principles from specific situations.
Using this approach, this paper investigates how evidence on the effects of raising the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA), "one of the most thoroughly evaluated social interventions of our time," (Ross, 1992) was evaluated in the prologue to the passage, in 1984, of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act (NMDAA), which provided strong and ultimately successful incentives for all states to raise their MLDA to 21. We examine how well the federal government assessed the extant evidence on the effects of the raised MLDA, how well it assessed the limitations of that evidence, how underlying intellectual and institutional factors influenced these assessments, and whether subsequent assessments of drunk driving legislation exhibited similar features.
3
The paper proceeds in three stages. Sections I and II describe the social and political context of the NMDAA and offer a retrospective look at how this legislation has affected traffic fatalities. Next, Sections III and IV examine how the political system evaluated, at the point of decision, the available evidence and its potential weaknesses. Finally, Sections V and VI consider the intellectual and institutional factors shaping this evaluation. Section VII concludes.
We are, we believe, able to induce general principles from this specific situation. They are, in economic terms, fundamental, based on agency, specialization, and exchange. They explain the excessive optimism about the effects of the NMDAA and subsequent drunk driving legislation, and the powerful intellectual and institutional factors underlying this result.
Section I. A Brief History of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act.
Legislation to curtail drunk driving and youth drinking began in the late 1970s, a reversal of the increased permissiveness earlier that decade, when many states lowered their drinking ages. From 1976 From -1980 , thirteen states raised their drinking ages, generally by one year.
Between 1981 and 1983 , twelve more states raised their drinking ages, thirty-four states adopted per se blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits, and eleven adopted administrative license revocation. Activity crested between 1984 and 1986 , with the passage of hundreds of state laws, as documented in Table 1 .
This activity was associated with three concomitant social changes, each also documented in These two social changes contributed to the third, in attitudes. The public became much less accepting of driving after drinking:
The American public is far less tolerant of drunk driving that they were ten years ago. It's no longer funny for Johnny Carson to joke about the issue. (Judith Stone, Director, Federal Affairs, National Safety Council, H5, June 1988, p. 24.) For…decades, the enormous toll of death and injury that occurred in the United States was regarded as accidental in almost a cosmic sense. The statistical toll of road accidents was collected and reported with an air of fatalism similar to attitudes toward earthquakes, tornadoes, or other natural disasters. At the same time, the…paradigm of responsibility began and ended with the personal fault of the parties to the accident. The public perception now in the United States…is that the manner in which…laws are drafted and enforced can have important effects on highway deaths and injuries (Zimring, 1988 Cook and Tauchen (1984) and Weinstein (1987) , find traffic fatalities among the affected ages increase by six or seven percent. Early panel analyses of raised MLDAs, discussed below, find an effect of about 12%, but later studies' estimates again average six or seven percent (Dee, 1999; Eisenberg, 2003; Young and Likens, 2000; Young and Beilinska-Kwapisz, 2006; Polnicki et al., 2007; and Miron and Tetelbaum, 2009 ).
This trend in findings stems partly, but not wholly, from the evolution in methods. As documented by Grant (2011) for three Congressionally-incentivized drunk driving laws and by Miron and Tetelbaum (2009) for the MLDA specifically, fatality changes associated with new laws are consistently larger in those states that adopt them earliest, without being spurred to do so by Congress, even when the estimation method is kept the same. This too causes estimates of these laws' effects to trend toward zero over time. Overall, the literature converges to reasonable extent. This is, in part, a natural consequence of the ethos of academia, which is organized as an "independent, collective, cumulative, open-ended enterprise of knowledge creation and testing" (Henig, 2008, p. 232) .
Over the decades, one could observe the slow resolution of conflicts in the MLDA literature over measurement (Williams et al., 1983 vs. Males, 1986 Hammond, 1973 vs. Zylman, 1974 , specification (Garber, 1988), and execution (General Accounting Office, or GAO, 1987) . But it took decades to achieve. Policymakers contemplating action in 1984 did not have this luxury.
The evidence to be evaluated at that time was highly disparate in method, sample, and result. Any hope that this competition would result in median-voter-style moderation is quickly dispelled by a review of the evidence cited. On both sides, this was a highly selective subset of the whole. Consider, for example, the work of one influential researcher, Alexander Wagenaar.
Wagenaar (1981) found that in the year after Michigan raised its drinking age from 18 to 21, in 1978, crashes involving 18-20 year old drivers whom police reported had been drinking fell by 31%. Because police-reported drinking can be unreliable, a common "three-factor surrogate" was also analyzed; it fell by 18%. There was little change in control groups. Later Wagenaar (1983) found that after Maine raised its drinking age from 18 to 20, in 1977, crashes by affected drivers with police-reported drinking rose slightly, while the three-factor surrogate fell by 19%.
Witnesses supporting a raised MLDA repeatedly cited only the largest number, a 31% A review of all the evidence cited in these hearings, reflected in the bubble plots in Figure 3 , confirms this selectivity. As before, each bubble represents a study, but its color now indicates the authors' affiliation, while its area is proportional to the number of entities that cited it; studies ultimately published in refereed journals are circumscribed in black. As before, the horizontal axis is the year of release or publication; the vertical axis is the percentage change in fatalities involving affected drivers.
The top plot in the figure depicts the evidence cited by three high-profile raised-MLDA advocates-MADD, the IIHS, and the AAA-across the three hearings held prior to July, 1984.
The weighted or unweighted means or medians of this evidence all indicate a fatality reduction of at least 20%. In contrast, raised-MLDA opponents, having few supportive studies to cite, instead referred to the experiences of states where MLDA increases were not associated with fatality changes at all. These assessments were intransigent even after the NMDAA became law (H4, 1986, pp. 51, 174, 186 ):
Allan Williams, VP for Research, IIHS: There is no question that raising the alcohol purchasing age results in fewer alcohol-related motor vehicle crash deaths and injuries in this high-risk group. It reduces them by 10-20%, and it does so year after year…If anything, too much research has been done on this topic.
Michael Birkley, Board Member, National Licensed Beverage Association: Despite the frequently recurring theme in popular accounts of selected studies, we have found no consistently reliable basis for the conclusion that raising the legal drinking age has, can, or is even likely to save lives among the affected age group in any jurisdiction. In our opinion, none of the so-called drinking age impact studies conducted to date are capable of supporting such a conclusion.
These excesses were not temporized by testimony from government agencies. In fact, these agencies were unreservedly supportive of the raised MLDA's effects, and cited evidence that was even more favorable than that cited by advocates. The middle plot in Figure 3 illustrates the evidence cited by five government entities, identified in the note to the table, in these same three hearings. This time, the weighted or unweighted means or medians alwaysexceed 25%. These numbers resemble those quoted in President Reagan's signing statement, but vastly exceed the best estimate that could have been obtained at the time.
That estimate comes from the GAO, which, in 1986, conducted a systematic literature review and evaluation, the subject of the fourth hearing listed above. The evidence cited therein, fourteen mostly quasi-experimental studies of fatal or injury crashes meeting reasonable methodological standards, is listed in the bottom plot in Figure 3 . With three (not unusual) exceptions, identified in the plot, each study was produced by 1984. The mean and median effect of a raised MLDA across these fourteen studies is a more modest 13%.
More or less, the 20-25% figure put forward by raised-MLDA advocates was adopted by
Congress. The wide-ranging, relatively philosophical Congressional debate did not focus on the empirical evidence. Most claims of the NMDAA's effects devolved to an influential IIHS study of nine MLDA-raising states (Williams et al., 1983 , well-represented in Figure 3 ), which found an average fatality reduction of 28%. These claims were rarely disputed.
Citations of this figure collapsed shortly afterwards, however, when five new studies, each analyzing several law-changing states, supplanted the single-state studies that had predominated. Saffer and Grossman (1987) , Hoxie and Skinner (1987), DuMouchel, Williams, and Zador (1987) , Arnold (1985) , and Hoskin, Yalung-Mathews, and Carraro (1986) found that raised MLDAs reduced fatalities by 8%, 11%, 13%, 13%, and 15%, respectively. 7 Twenty years later, as Figure 1 shows, large-scale panel estimates were notably smaller.
Section IV. The Evaluation of the Evidence in Four Congressional Hearings: Part 2.
7 These findings suggest single-state studies utilized states where the estimated impact of the raised MLDA was relatively large. Certainly the distribution of studies across states in 1984 was not uniform. Of nineteen MLDA-raising states, three-IL, MI, and ME-were studied thrice each, while eight others-MD, NJ, RI, GA, OH, TX, CT, and NE-had never been studied. 14 Quantifying the mean effects implied by the evidence is necessary, but not sufficient, because it takes each study's estimates (or those deemed methodologically sound) at face value. Given the potential weaknesses of this evidence, evaluators should also attempt to identify the sign and rough magnitude of any potential bias in the estimates. This is particularly important for the quasi-experimental studies that dominated the early MLDA literature, because of two acknowledged limitations in study design. As no controls are present, other factors that could influence outcomes are not explicitly accounted for. And the short sample period, generally four or five pre-law years and one or two post-law years, complicates attempts to account for pre-existing trends.
The results to date of studies increasing (sic) the drinking age have generally been favorable. However, these laws have been in place for only a short time.
During that time, other factors which could produce a reduction in accidents have been present…the question of whether increasing the legal age of purchase will reduce accidents remains to be proven when longer experience with these higher age laws generates sufficient data for a more definitive analysis of impact, from which the effect of transient economic factors can be eliminated. (Alcohol and Highway Safety: A Review of the State of Knowledge, 1984, p. 49.) Any bias thereby engendered is likely to be favorable. A longstanding theme in social science, a product of the law and economics literature, emphasizes that estimates of a law's effect on social outcomes are influenced by the circumstances of its adoption (see Andenaes, 1975, and Siegelman, 2002) . They will be favorably biased for laws inspired by changes in social attitudes, adopted as part of a package of broader reforms, or passed because of a temporary flare-up in an undesirable behavior. As the substantial social changes documented above coincided with the adoption of early laws raising the drinking age, this theme is potentially significant, as some contemporaneous observers recognized:
Most research published to date is based on faulty premises such as assuming a direct cause and effect relationship between drinking age and crashes without taking into account other variables…[such as] changes in DWI enforcement and increased public education…and covering only short time periods which are inadequate for determining whether changes occurring after a lowering or raising of the drinking age are indicative of long-term effects. (Ronald Sarasin, Director of Government Relations, National Restaurant Association, H2, 1984, pp. 44-46.) A corollary to this theme emphasizes how public support helps make laws effective:
I have read over most of the papers I have written on this general subject during the past thirty years. In nearly every one of them, I state that the weakest link in attacking this problem has been public support. What we perceive as low-level action against the drunken driver is probably a direct result of lack of public support. We can inform and we can enforce and as a result change behavior through fear for a while. But when we fail to change attitudes, regression is bound to occur (Borkenstein, 1985) .
[ Given the strong claims documented in the previous section, however, it would be surprising to see such judiciousness in abundance. Indeed, it was not common.
criticized the evidence so broadly that their valid criticisms were more easily overlooked. In the end, these criticisms could not overcome the general legitimacy of the techniques utilized and the absence of a broad academic consensus on this issue (see below). In Congressional debate the validity of the evidence supporting the raised MLDA was not questioned.
Thus optimism prevailed both in amalgamating the existing estimates of the MLDA's effect and in determining the confidence that could be placed in those estimates. Did this optimism alter the political outcome-the passage of the NMDAA? The answer is speculative,
and not central to the theme of this paper, but it may have, by influencing President Reagan's decision to switch from opposition to support. While the only roll call vote on the NMDAA had a veto-proof majority (81-16 in the Senate), legislative progress on the NMDAA did not proceed until (immediately) after President Reagan changed his position on the issue.
Section V. Intellectual Underpinnings.
It would be too facile, and wrong, to ascribe the outcomes in Sections III and IV merely to an adversarial system headed by political actors. Democracies themselves, after all, are adversarial systems headed by political actors. Such an explanation neglects the powerful intellectual and institutional underpinnings that undermine the effectiveness of this system. To maximize the generality of the ensuing discussion, these underpinnings are developed from first principles, applied to the NMDAA, and then related to subsequent drunk driving legislation.
Imagine a new policy intended to address a social problem, which is implemented in a small number of jurisdictions. Soon, interest naturally arises as to this policy's effectiveness, though the outcomes data available for analysis is limited. Initially, the social net benefits of an analysis of the policy's effect would increase by waiting for more data, like in Barzel's (1968) theory of patents, where technological progress reduces the cost of making a given discovery over time. But, as in Barzel (1968) , studies appear as soon as they yield positive net benefits to the parties conducting them. In a world of policy advocacy, this could be quite early.
With little post-policy data available, these studies may only be able to use crude analytical methods; in general, both limitations inhibit these studies' accuracy. If the policy seems sufficiently promising, however, it will diffuse across the country, increasing the breadth and span of post-policy data available for analysis and facilitating the use of improved methods.
Generally the accuracy of these later studies improves, and this continues going forward, probably at a diminishing rate. Ideally, the literature eventually reaches a reasonable degree of convergence in method and result.
This process adequately describes the evolution of the raised-MLDA literature in Figure   1 . But it is incomplete, because it omits the essential fact that evaluation of studies in any scientific field is conducted within a body of assumptions, techniques, etc., that are generally accepted by the experts working in that field-namely, a paradigm. But there need not be only one. Where the convergence of academia is slow, and answers are needed quickly, specialization according to comparative advantage suggests the emergence of two paradigms, one geared to the urgent needs of policy, the other to "pure knowledge." This appears to be the case in several policy-related areas (Dror, 1971; Henig, 2008, Ch. 8 ).
Certainly it is true in traffic safety, where two paradigms use different research designs suited for these disparate objectives. Early evaluations of new state laws typically employ the quasi-experimental methods described above. Conducted mostly by-for lack of a more precise term-"program evaluators" with strong links to policymaking, these are often found in Figure 1 , along with more subtle divisions between policymaking and academia depicted in that figure and in Figure 3 (which identifies published studies with a black ring). Those studies that were most influential in the policy process have not been heavily cited within academia, while many influential quasi-experimental studies were never published.
Being geared to different purposes, these paradigms are segmented, to a reasonable degree, and coexist more than they compete. Drunk driving studies in safety journals rarely highlight the potential biases in their estimates, while those in economics journals rarely acknowledge that their panel estimators work best only when the policy in question has long been settled. This segmentation is perpetuated by cultural and philosophical differences between the two fields, which "seem to be too many…to permit cooperation" (Dror, 1971, Chapter 6, and p. 34), and by a substantial temporal divide in their studies of any given issue, clearly visible in both the raised-MLDA and lowered-MLDA literatures in Figure 1 . This is not pre-ordained or universal. Quasi-experimental and traditional regression methods are vigorously compared, for example, in highly visible literatures on the employment effects of the minimum wage and job training programs. It is, rather, a matter of practice.
There is no question that quasi-experimental traffic safety studies focus on estimating short run effects, for which the technique was designed (Robson et al., 2001; Campbell and Ross, 1968), or that panel techniques' comparative advantage lies in estimating long-run effects using nationwide data. Safety journals clearly consider quasi-experimental methods adequate to the task, while economics journals strongly prefer panel estimates instead.
Most importantly, there has been little comparison within traffic safety of the relative efficacy of these techniques. The closest paper we could find, a theoretical, multi-technique critique by Garber (1988) , has been virtually ignored. Some literature reviews (Shults et al., 2001 ; Wagenaar and Toomey 2002) do identify higher-quality and lower-quality studies, but this is based only on the execution of a given study design. The relative merits of these designs are not compared in these reviews or in reviews by the GAO or NHTSA, as discussed below.
Thus, in practice, these two techniques are generally used in different spheres for different purposes, and accepted within that sphere as valid for the purpose for which it is used.
Because the scientific competence of a study is determined within a given paradigm, this segmentation complicates the already-challenging task facing political actors assessing the evidence, who now must weigh paradigms in addition to assessing the studies themselves. This is not much facilitated by the presence of experts, who tend to hail from one paradigm or the other, but not both. This was certainly true for the NMDAA. NHTSA, the NSC, and the GAO all utilized the quasi-experimental paradigm, and never acknowledged that a judicious assessment of the evidence might be merited-even when asked (H4, 1986, p. 13-14) :
Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-CT): How do you take into account whether or not, for example, there has been a strong movement within a state among high school students to focus on this problem? This has an important consequence: to shift, somewhat, the assessment criteria used by the political system away from scientific competence toward something very different:
credibility.
Factual conclusions are not easily separable from considerations having to do with the plausibility of [the researcher's] assumptions and his selection of the evidence or choice of methodology. And because there seems to be no objective way of checking the conclusions of analysis, the credibility of the expert becomes as important as his competence (Majone, 1989, p. 4) .
This shift reinforces the bifurcation between these two paradigms, as one is more directly linked to policymaking than the other. Its practitioners are more familiar with this adversarial process, more likely to have alternate sources of credibility (Innvaer et al., 2002) .
Increasingly, public debates about regulatory decisions [and other modern policy issues] resemble adversary proceedings in a court of law, but with an important difference-the lack of generally accepted rules of evidence. Some participants are able to take advantage of the relative informality of the process, but to scientists even codified adversary procedures seem inappropriate and alien to their tradition. In science the issue is not a witness's credibility but his specific competence…and this is not reliably established by an adversary debate (Majone, 1989, p. 4) . This was also true for the NMDAA. Several supporters of a raised drinking age, including NHTSA, the NTSB, and the NSC, have institutional credibility before Congress, as does the IIHS, which interacts with policymakers on a wide range of traffic safety issues. Technical prowess only reinforces this other source of credibility. Thus, there was no imperative for NHTSA to publish three in-house MLDA studies from the early 1980s, discussed below, or for the NTSB's support of a raised MLDA to be based on a formal evidence review. (In fact, its widely-repeated calculations of lives saved, used to support its recommendation, were erroneous: Males, 1986.) This contrasted with academic witnesses, who possessed competence but no alternate source of credibility, and raised MLDA opponents, who generally lacked both. This imbalance further limited the self-correcting properties of an adversarial system.
Two other drunk driving laws have received NMDAA-like Congressional incentives: .08
laws that lower the per se illegal BAC limit from (generally) .10 to .08, and "zero tolerance" laws that lower this limit to .01 or .02 for drivers under twenty-one. Grant's (2011) exhaustive review of their sizeable literatures shows that they too are segmented, following patterns in study design and result that closely resemble Figure 1 . In both cases strong, quasi-experimental findings for early-adopting states are, much later, supplanted by notably smaller estimates from panel regressions conducted by academic social scientists. And, while neither law was subject to Congressional hearings as was the raised MLDA, the evidence employed in support of .08 laws was similarly segmented, as discussed below.
Section VI. Institutional Underpinnings.
The political actors who must ultimately assess the evidence often possess limited technical knowledge. A common remedy is to locate this knowledge in an agency overseen by those political actors. Here that agency is NHTSA, founded in 1970 to address both vehicle and behavioral factors. The former took precedence in the agency's early years, consistent with the spirit of the times (Gusfield, 1988) , but from the 1980s forward behavioral factors, particularly drunk driving and restraint use, have received increasing attention (see H6, 2002) .
The existence of such agencies ameliorates this knowledge problem, but introduces a principal-agent problem in its place. In the early 1980s, interest in the effects of higher drinking ages, and the need for further evidence, heightened NHTSA's roles as arbiter and facilitator of research. In both roles it is intended to act as an agent for the public and, by extension, Congress, discerning as accurately as possible how a raised MLDA would affect traffic safety. In light of the previous discussion, this would require incorporating insights, results, and techniques from both analytical paradigms. As public choice theory cautions, however, the agency may have private objectives that deviate from those of the public, such as enhancing its influence or quelling criticism. Its behavior may then deviate from the ideal in order to help achieve these objectives.
For the behavioral factors side of NHTSA, this organizational latitude could be used to influence the most pressing intellectual issue it then faced: the relative efficacy of two approaches for addressing drunk driving. 9 One is based on deterrence, negatively sanctioning 9 The principal-agent problem also extends to the vehicle-factors side of NHTSA, though, in focusing on regulation and standard-setting, it differs greatly from its counterpart (see Breyer, 1982) . During investigations of vehicle defects, Pecht et al. (2005) find NHTSA to be overly deferential to the automaker's characterization of the problem and its severity, while Cavasos (2007) shows that, compared to the Federal Aviation Administration, rule-setting by NHTSA is more heavily influenced by industry. He attributes this to NHTSA's youth: federal regulation of passenger cars, unlike that of the airlines, began long after the industry had been 24 alcohol possession (as in the MLDA) or driving under the influence of alcohol:
Americans place a high value on individualism. They see the world as malleable to individual will and responsive to choice and moral character. It is to the individual that Americans so frequently look in placing responsibility for social problems. It is the base assumption that supports the great faith we have that punishing the bad guys, the drivers, will deter drinking-driving in a society whose social institutions deter public transportation and support drinking practices with limited constraints (Joseph Gusfield, in Ross, 1992, pp. xi-xii) .
The alternative stresses the limits of deterrence and "views drunk driving as a predictable consequence of existing social institutions" (Ross, 1992, p. 167) :
My father was an alcoholic. And, boy, I am going to tell you: All I remember from when I was a kid was how alcoholism can just literally destroy a family… But I used to be a police officer years ago, and I guess because of my own background and the experience I had in law enforcement, I am convinced that alcoholism is a sickness that you just cannot cure by tougher penalties. It does not work. It did not work for my dad. And it does not work for anybody else either… So it just seems to me that we ought to be focusing more of our resources on treatment and recovery programs too. (Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, R-CO, H6, Feb., 2002, p. 50 .)
The deterrence approach prevailed during the 1980s. It was "understandably popular with people who have directly or indirectly, through friends and relatives, experienced harm in the course of alcohol-related crashes"-the natural constituency of drunk driving advocacy groups such as MADD, which rose to prominence during this period (Ross, 1992, p. 176, and multiple sources cited therein). This was buttressed by the concomitant political shift toward conservatism (Reinarman, 1988) , the "inevitable change in style that happens when criminal justice initiatives trickle down from elites to the generally conservative crime-control ideology of local America," and a "hardening of public attitudes about the dangers of driving after drinking…due in part to scientific demonstrations linking elevated blood alcohol with established, weakening the agency's ability to resist "pressure from actors it regulates" (p. 234).
automobile crashes" (Zimring, 1988, pp. 379, 381) . Ross (1992) deftly analyzes the politics of the deterrence approach, pointing out that it was in NHTSA's interest to support it:
Much of the effectiveness of the citizen's movement [such as MADD] is due to its alliance with the traffic safety establishment. State and federal officials have found the movement useful for demonstrating popular support for statutes and other measures proposed by the safety agencies, while the programs endorsed by the movement have been rendered rational and politically sophisticated in the process. The NHTSA has explicitly recognized the value of this constituency and has taken steps to enlarge and strengthen it (p. 177).
In 1984, NHTSA's support for deterrence in combatting drunk driving was clear in its publication Alcohol and Highway Safety (1984, Ch. 6) , in which five of the seven key elements listed in its "current approach" to tackling the problem were deterrence-based.
Thus, the intellectual expression of the aforementioned principal-agent problem would be for NHTSA's research strategy to be shaped to stress deterrence. Such a strategy would emphasize the quasi-experimental studies yielding the strongest findings supporting drunk driving laws, and would deemphasize the cautionary social science theme articulated above.
This was apparent in the four studies of raised MLDAs conducted by NHTSA. The first three, Maxwell (1981) , Klein (1981), and Arnold (1985) , included in the GAO review, used sound quasi-experimental designs to estimate short run effects in early-adopting states. Their effect sizes, a 9-15% reduction in fatalities, were typical of the time, and well-supported in two studies though not the third, which interpreted its findings very favorably. 10 None addressed potential 10 Klein focuses on fatalities from single-vehicle accidents involving male drivers. He finds that, after Maine's MLDA was raised from 18 to 20, daytime and nighttime fatalities involving 18-year-olds fell, in about the same proportion, while daytime and nighttime fatalities involving 19-year-olds were both unchanged. Because daytime accidents are treated as a control group, this suggests the law had no effect. But Klein focused instead on a different finding: a 15% 26 bias in the estimates. The fourth, a follow-up to Arnold by Womble (1989) , was the only study to be published, and the last to use traditional before-after quasi-experimental methods. As the MLDA literature had moved past these methods by then, this study attracted little notice.
NHTSA continues to use Arnold (1985) Legal Limit" and "Setting Limits, Saving Lives." These referenced mostly quasi-experimental studies, omitting economists' two regression analyses, Chaloupka, Saffer, and Grossman (1993) and Dee (2001) , which obtained far smaller estimates. After identifying methodological problems with several of these quasi-experimental studies, including some conducted or sponsored by NHTSA, the GAO determined that "NHTSA's position-that this evidence was conclusive-was overstated."
In fact, since the NMDAA, this research strategy has become somewhat institutionalized, via NHTSA's heavy reliance on contractors. Of its 21 analogous alcohol impaired-driving Behavioral Safety Research Reports, 18 were produced under contract.
Interviews with several knowledge-producing federal agencies indicated that this is an unusual reduction in fatalities involving 18-year-old and 19-year-old male drivers in all nighttime accidents, not just those involving a single vehicle; no control group estimate was obtained. This generous interpretation was adopted by the GAO and thus included in Figure 3 . 27 mechanism for producing this kind of study; NHTSA did not provide an explanation for using this approach. 11 In other interviews, an independent traffic safety policy advocate and a former high-level NHTSA administrator both bemoaned the "lack of an independent research capability within the agency," particularly on the behavioral factors side, and described its origins and consequences as mostly or wholly political, noting that its absence benefits stakeholders that gain from deterrence-oriented policies. It also allows the sponsoring agency to shape the project's scope and design (see Henig, 2008, p. 234) . Thus, NHTSA's contracted research in this area uses quasi-experimental designs almost 11 By mid-2011, NHTSA had published 302 Behavioral Safety Research Reports classified as "Impaired Driving-Alcohol"; 84% were produced by contractors. This is often understandable, such as for demonstration projects: a grant is not feasible, as this is not basic research of general interest, nor is in-house production, because of the project's interdisciplinary nature and distant location. But one cannot justify using contractors to evaluate traffic safety laws in this way, as this involves analyzing publicly available data with straightforward statistical methods to study a topic of general interest. A grant would be superior, and more typical. These traffic safety law evaluations are the 21 reports referred to here. Five knowledge-producing federal agencies were contacted: the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) . In each interview, which typically lasted half an hour, a medium-to-high level research administrator (or their representative) articulated that agency's "strategy" for producing knowledge and gave a basic rationale for using that strategy. In contrast, we were unable to speak or correspond with the administrator in charge of NHTSA's behavioral factors research or a member of the agency's communication office, after multiple attempts. 28 exclusively, in marked contrast to analogous studies funded by NIAAA grants (see Figure 1 ).
In turn, the diversity of ideas and methods to which NHTSA is exposed is reduced. Thus, Similarly, NHTSA's engagement with academia continues to be relatively weak. 12 Political oversight is unlikely to change this status quo.
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VII. Discussion and Conclusion.
Early evidence on a new policy often suffers from deficiencies in quantity and quality that make it difficult to evaluate. For non-experts to do so accurately in an adversarial, politicized environment is a daunting task. It would be ingenuous to expect the political system 12 Using the Web of Science, NHTSA's academic (article) output from 1995-2010 was compared with that of the other agencies contacted above. Of the CPSC, EPA, FTC, HUD, and NHTSA, the two agencies that publish the least are the CPSC and NHTSA. These two agencies, unlike the others, also draw the majority of their coauthors from consulting, rather than academia. Further details are available from the author.
13 Discussions with staff on two oversight committees, representing both parties and both houses of Congress, confirmed their indifference with the technical issues raised here. A recent hearing, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the NHTSA's Highway Traffic Safety Programs," referred only once to improving the evaluation of behavioral safety initiatives (Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, July 16, 2008, p. 35) . A more recent, high-profile hearing ("NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead," Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 11, 2010) contained much discussion about the agency's funding, competence, and openness, but nothing about the evaluation of traffic safety legislation. 29 to do so ideally, and this paper confirms that, for the NMDAA at least, it did not. Raised MLDA opponents were, in this theater, outmatched by advocates, fostering an overly optimistic assessment of the evidence available at the time.
On the other hand, it is equally ingenuous to assume that other mechanisms are superior. We found no evidence of this for the NMDAA or for subsequent research on drunk driving. Academia, segmented into distinct paradigms, has no effective mechanism for meshing and reconciling the findings of both, particularly on the time scales required by policymakers.
Neither does the bureaucracy, NHTSA, which, overly wedded to deterrence, lacks the necessary quantity and diversity of in-house human capital.
Instead, all three mechanisms were complementary, in a perverse way, reinforcing each other's weaknesses. The adversarial political process supports intellectual segmentation, which, in turn, weakens that process, complicating the task of evaluating the evidence and deemphasizing competence in favor of credibility. NHTSA relies on segmentation to focus on one paradigm to the exclusion of the other, a practice that supports this segmentation in return.
Thus, political reforms are unlikely to be successful-and may not even be neededwithout appropriate intellectual and institutional reforms. These institutional reforms would include enhancing NHTSA's in-house knowledge base to incorporate a wider range of methodological prowess and greater familiarity with the social science theme articulated above; fusing stronger links between NHTSA and the academic community; and broadening NHTSA's research focus to incorporate the long-run effects of older laws that have become widely adopted, in addition to the short-run effects of new laws. Research departments at some federal agencies, such as the FTC, already have this kind of intellectual diversity and links to academia.
Intellectual reforms, on the other hand, can erode the segmentation dividing the two analytical paradigms. This can be done by searching for analytical methods of evaluating newly adopted laws that are more robust to the estimation problems identified above, and by "closing the loop," comparing short run estimates of a law's effect with retrospective evidence on its long run outcomes, as Grant (2011) does for the MLDA, .08 laws, and zero tolerance laws.
Such changes could lead to less enthusiastic empirical and political support for some traffic safety legislation, but that need not mean more traffic fatalities. Every action has an opportunity cost. Political and intellectual capital spent supporting laws that are relatively ineffective could be used to seek out and evaluate laws or other, non-deterrence-based mechanisms that may be more effective, and supporting those that ultimately pass the bar. Note: Newspapers include the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and The Wall Street Journal. Periodical volume comes from the Magazine Index. The attitudinal questions were phrased: "A person should feel free to drink one or two drinks, or more, when going to drive a car," and "A person should feel free to drink enough to feel the effects, or more, when going to drive a car." 
